From the African side, three competing frontiers and groups were in play. One group was dominated by African, Euro-African, and European!American traders resident in the Rio Pongo. These merchants perhaps foresaw a restricted market for African conunodities on the American side of the Atlantic and a steady source for trade goods from Baltimore at advantageous prices, a trade composed principally of commodities and exclusive in its focus. Any arrangementbetween Pengo-based merchants and political elites and the Baltimore group would also involve an expansion of the Pongo-based commodities and secondary/imported/smuggled American goods southward toward Freetown and the Sherbro region, and to the newly formed African-American settlements near Monrovia. Reciprocally, an African-American frontier of commerce and influence would expand northward from Monrovia along established and reconnecting lines. Expanding commercial frontiers from the Rio Pongo, from Baltimore, and from the Society's southern settlement conflicted inevitably with the designs of well-entrenched British commercial and political interests based in Sierra Leone.
In 1822, two apparently unrelated events came together in Baltimore to join various interests, and thus set the stage for the possibility of an exclusive arrangement between Pongo-based and Baltimore-based merchants. Interestingly both Wilkinson was an admirable choice for such a task and the Pongo an excellent place to recruit such a person. How better to find a potential slaver than to hire a person knowledgeable in the ways of the trade? The Pongo River had attracted Europeans or Euro-African traders during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but many had come at the beginning of the nineteenth century when several American and British merchants established residence there, married local women, and produced offspring often related to ruling lineages. Wilkinson (1795-1861) was a descendant of a British father and a Baga mother, the latter a member of important Luso-African lineages that included the Gomez and Fernandez branches. s A cousin, Jellorum Harrison, had studied in England late in the eighteenth century, had traveled in central Asia as a Christian missionary, and had served as catechist in the Church Missionary Society's Pongo Mission schools in the early 181Os. Wilkinson received his education in England under the Reverend Thomas Scott before returning to Fallangia in 1813.9
Wilkinson accepted the challenge of finding the missing sons partly as a extension to a larger plan that included continuing, once he had found the sons, to Baltimore where he would purchase a cargo of trade goods for his factory at Fallangia in the Rio Pongo, Early in 1823, Wilkinson crossed the Atlantic, found the sons whom the French captain had abandoned, and arranged their return to Africa. From there, Wilkinson proceeded to Baltimore, purchased trade goods, and arranged their transport on the schooner Fidelity, scheduled to leave Baltimore for the African coast early in October.to The Fidelity was owned by Jesse Tyson of Baltimore and was under contract to carry emigrants and merchandise to the Society's settlement at Cape Mesurado.!'
Wilkinson's timely arrival in Baltimore at the height of the General Paez legal proceeding, however, added an ingredient to the expectations of all parties involved in the court case. Those in favor of abolition, emigration, and colonization, and by this time the federal government, were searching for a resolution of that dilemma, any solution that would adhere to provisions of the 1819 Act and remove the African crew members from the United States. By the time Wilkinson arrived in Baltimore, imprecise translations with these Africans had clearly muddled understandings, and the Africans were then asking to remain in the U.S. rather than be repatriated. That Wilkinson spoke English, pidgin English, and four African trade languages (Susu, Baga, Mandingo, Fula) made him an invaluable resource in Baltimore in August-October 1823. 12 Wilkinson acted as interpreter and explained that the Federal Govemment intended to repatriate them all. 13 Whether it was the intent of Jesse Tyson, Richard Wilkinson, or the Society's appointed representative, Dr. Eli Ayers, is unclear, but the General Paez incident served as the nexus for a plan to produce a "Baltimore Trading Company." Eventually this would include the firms of Jesse Tyson and Sons, M'Fadon and Harris, Joseph King, Jr., and Thomas Tyson, all acting as Baltimore-based agents for traders wishing to trade to West Africa. The announcement of such a company first appeared in the Federal Gazette (Baltimore) in April 1823, clearly before Wilkinson's arrival on the scene, but after the American Colonization Society had become involved in the incident.ls Perhaps those involved initially only projected an exclusive monopolistic arrangement with settlers at Cape Mesurado, with Dr. Eli Ayres, the Society's director in Africa, acting as its supercargo or long-term agent.
Wilkinson's arrival and participation in resolving the General Pdez misunderstanding expanded the opportunities for all parties involved. Future Baltimore commercial links would include both the American Colonization Society settlementat Mesurado andmerchants in the Pengo/Nunez region, wherepaths into the interior crossed fewer ethnic boundaries and where a powerful Fula state in the interior exercised substantial control over international roads to the coast. Hides, ivory, groundnuts, gold, gum, stock, rice, wax, and perhaps coffee, were plentiful in the rivers and in the interior, and demand for such manufactured goods as cotton cloth, firearms, gunpowder, flour and sundry goods, and tobacco and rum was high and steady on the coast and in the interior. The arrangements for trade between long-distance Aftican traders and coastal-resident merchants were longstanding, and landlord-stranger relationships were well established. Relationships between resident African, Euro-African, and European!American traders and American suppliers/consumers was also ongoing in the Pengo/Nunez, first in slave trading and commodities commerce and by the 1820s almost exclusively in commodities. 15 If a company agency in the Cape Mesurado region would provide one zone for merchandising for Baltimore-produced goods. a second agency in the Pengo/Nunez region could effectively double the Company's potential market, perhaps tripling it if larger and wealthier populations and more secure paths were brought into consideration.
From a Liberian or American Colonization Society perspective, the formation of a "Baltimore Trading Company" provided new opportunities. Whether Dr. Ayres linked himself to the fortune of such a company is unclear, but it appears likely that Jehudi Ashmun, a recent resident of Baltimore who replaced Ayres as government agent at Monrovia in 1824, saw himself as the Baltimore Trading Company's exclusive "agent" on the coast.Is Perhaps Ashmun interpreted his arrangement with the Company as little more than a personal financial opportunity, but he apparently envisioned possible settlements of repatriated free or treed African-Americans in the Rio Pongo as physical demonstrations of Monrovian and Baltimore interests in rivers located north of Sierra Leone. I? This would mean that the Company's success would link existing African-Americans from Liberia with future African-Americans in the Pongo region, with African-AmericanlNova Scotian settlers in the Sierra Leone River.
Merchants resident in the Rio Pongo had earlier considered just such an arrangement with the U.S. According to a later account by Ashmun, a group of traders in the Pongo, "in conjunction with otherinfluential residents and chiefs," had written to the American Colonization Society in 1820 requesting that it send African-American settlers, but he noted that tItis request had apparently "miscarried."18 American residents in the area at that time included Styles Lightburn and Paul Faber of Charleston and the Curtises of Boston, who formed a marriage alliance with the Kati ruJing Susu lineage at Thia.l? Two trade towns near Kissing where the Curtises held court were called Boston and Charleston, clearly attesting to their American origins.
Between 1820 and 1823, however, significant change had come to the Pongo. The Royal Anti-Slavery Squadron had increased patrols north of Sierra Leone, raided Pongo factories believed to be sites of slave trading, and significantly increased the risk that its officers wouJd charge Europeans trading in slaves with piracy. Instead of exclusively exporting slaves, many resident traders subseThesearrangements included sources for tobacco, rum, drygoods, pineboards. and other goods in demand inAfrica,in return forslaves. quently diversified theiroperations, with severaldescribingthemselves as planters or plantation managers, accumulating many slaves andproducing suchcommodities as coffee and groundnuts for export. One trader, for instance, secured a plantation overseer from the French West Indies to help him develop his estate. Most continued to sell surplus or troublesome slaves to shippers, however. when an opportunity occurred and when risk of raids was low. Some "reformed" traders allied themselves with the British and against the Kati-Curtis coalition during the 1820-1823 raids, effectively dividing the river's traders into two camps. One group vocally supported conversion to commodities while the other expected to continue the slave trade. 20 Americans were members of both camps; clearly these alliances were based on more than just national identities.
Interestingly Wilkinson had remained neutral during this early trade dispute, partly because he was related to the ruling lineages of both the Susu and Baga peoples, and partly because neutrality was perhaps a less risky and more profitable stance for the moment. Seizure of the slaver Rosalia in 1822, for instance, had dramatized the risks for slave traders. Two notorious slavers of the upper Rio Pongo, John Ormond, Jr., and Styles Lightbum, subsequently informed Freetown of their intentions to abandon slave trading completely in favor of plantation agriculture in coffee. Others joined the shift to a slave-based plantation system as if in a stampede, at least on the surface. By 1823, Ormond reportedly owned 5,000 to 6,000 slaves, and Lightbum, several thousand.P To be sure, the evolving growth of plantation agriculture in the Pongo afforded new opportunity and challenge, but plantation agriculture itself was not new to this section of the coast. From the late eighteenth century, Susu headmen in Sumbuya, located south of present Conakry, had operated large farms (locally called lugars) where they grew rice for local consumption, for sale to slavers who frequented this coast, and for trade at Freetown once that settlement was established. Fendan Modu Dumbuya of Wonkapong, for example, a major trader and rice producer, owned several villages whose inhabitants were engaged in cloth weaving, salt production, and kola collection.t-The labor needs of most of these sectors met by slaves or subject/stranger peoples of varying types. A missionary who lived in this area in the early nineteenth century described several of these villages and the anxiety of inhabitants concerning uncertainties that accompanied slave status. 23 Susu villages were often segregated, with freemen occupying one village, subject/client peoples another, and slaves still a third. Some slaves were considered workers and were protected by law; others were subject to immediate sale or to the whims of owners. Many workers, even those of free status, were living on' and tending land and crops for the lord during a portion of the week, with remaining days available for their own use in a patron/client relationship.e' This perhaps characterized the majority of those engaged in agriculture, weaving, salt production, or kola collection. Others enjoyed few privileges. Such were the captive slaves who were destined to work in fields while awaiting eager traders from the Atlantic who came to purchase slaves as commodities in exchange for guns, powder, tobacco, and manufactured or processed goods.
The patterns in Sumbuya were well known to Susu ruling elites and traders in the Pongo. Missionaries in the Pongo (1808-1817) described lugars used locally in rice production. but their interest focused more on ruling lineages and the activities of slave traders than on domestic slavery or the status of subject peoples or strangers.s' Rice production required large numbers of workers, some of whom were assuredly of slave status. Those with rights to land and increasingly resident traders kept some slaves ready for market, but they employed others on lugars where they were still easily accessible should slave ships enter the river in search of large numbers.w This was especially true after 1820 when plantation agriculture expanded to include coffee and later groundnuts or rubber. Traders, both European and those of African or mixed descent, used free labor in their commerce and sometimes slaves as well, and sometimes failed to differentiate clearly between the two. 27 It was, therefore, an easy transition to shift from the lugars of subject villages to plantation agriculture because patterns remained very similar, except that slaves increasingly acquired security in their person and fewer expectations of being sold at coastal factories because their labor was required locally. For some traders, however, the temptation of easy cash for slaves was hard to give up. In consequence, slave trading and plantation agriculture coexisted into the 1840s, until slavers stopped visiting the rivers and markets 'for other commodities matched former trade values.
Shifting from active slave trading after 1820 to extensive plantation agricnlture and from a trader alliance where merchants regularly cooperated to snpply large ships with cargos of slaves to a fragmented and competitive commodities commerce brought changes in the system. Perhaps Wilkinson, as a neutral, aggressively supported a close relationship with American merchants. After a few newly arrived African-American immigrants left Fallangia in 1822-1823, even Wilkinson would have realized by the time he reached Baltimore in mid-1823 that it was unlikely that large numbers of African-American settlers would move into the Rio Pongo area, unless these settlers intended to assist in operating a slaveowning system or were willing to work as free labor alongside it. 28 Jehudi Ashmun, as government agent at Mesurado, even as late as 1827 continued to snpport African-American settlement in the Rio Pongo but suggested that it might be "easier and safer to colonize St. John's, than the Pongas."29 Once Wilkinson returned from Baltimore to his factory at Fallangia in December 1823, trade between Pongo merchants and the firms of Jesse Tyson and Sons, M'Fadon and Harris, Joseph King, Jr., and Thomas Tyson, occnrred, but perhaps differently than Wilkinson had projected. The contest between trader interests in the Pongo region had escalated during his six-month absence, and on his retum Wilkinson was forced to join the Kati-Curtis coalition. In the continuing 28 Infortnation about a landing of African-American immigrants at Fallangia in October.
1822 is sparseand is one of those tantalizing but ambiguous puzzle pieces that does not fit easily into the full picture. According to a report in PRO, F084121, Commissions General #4, 29 April 1823, the author wrote that the ship Dolphin landed an unspecified number of settlers from Charleston who had participated in a disturbance there and noted that these immigrants had all arrived in Freetown by 1823. Certainly this event references the Denmark Vesey rebellion planned at Charleston for the summer of 1822 and the fact that several free African-Americans of that city who were found guilty of participating in its planning were sentenced to transportation to a place outside the United States. That Fallangia was the original landing point is reasonable, considering the long-term relationship that existed between Charleston merchants and planters/slave-owners with Pengo-based suppliers. Styles Lightbum of Fallangia, for instance, came originally from Charleston. Daniel L. Schafer's work on connections between the Pongo and Charleston/Fernandina (East Florida) amply demonstrates that a special relationship existed between merchants/planters on both sides of the Atlantic and that Lightbum was an important player in this relationship. See Schafer, "Family Ties that Bind: Anglo-African Slave Traders in Africa and Florida, John Fraser and his Descendants," Abolition and Slavery 20, 3 (1999) "a man of sense and abilities, of a mild and humane character, and favourably disposed towards the whites, especially the Americans," and who spoke English "perfectly well."3S Additionally, the Rio Grande and Rio Pongo were nearby. Circumstances after 1820, however, led the Society to focus on the area to the south of Freetown instead. For a short time in 1820-1821, African-American settlers from the Society did live in Freetown, before the Society arranged for their permanent settlement at Cape Mesurado.P What particularly attracted British attention to American activities in the Rio Pongo in the mid-1820s, however, were two circumstances. One involved frequent reports from British-friendly merchants in the Pongo and Nunez that Americans were fighting for control of commerce and that British interests might be endangered. The second surrounded the visit by Jehudi Ashmun, American Colonization Society's principal agent at Monrovia, to Freetown in July 1827. General Neil Campbell, governor of the Sierra Leone Colony from August 1825 to August 1827, had gained fame during the Napoleonic Period. Not ready to permit a disorganized imperial structure or American designs in West Africa to soil his reputation, Campbell had attempted to bring persons and places under his control when he became governor in 1825. 40 When informed by Michael Proctor, a British merchant on the lies de Los who also had commercial interests in both the Pongo and Nunez rivers, that trade wars in the Pongo in 1823-1825 had occurred as a consequence of American intrigue andthatan arrangement between Baltimore and PongolNunez traders might be in the offing, Campbell had responded aggressively, Campbell notified London that Nunez-based and Pongobased traders were importing products directly from suppliers in the U.S. and were smuggling them in without paying the appropriate taxes. Such a charge was not new; Americans and local traders with access to American goods had successfully avoided British duties and regulations for decades. Early in July 1826 Campbell, at Proctor's urging, recommended that detachments be placed at the mouths of both the Pongo and Nunez rivers, arguing that their presence would stop slave trading in the area and no doubt smuggling.f Clearly Campbell understood the American influence in the Pongo as more than purely commercial; rather, he noted that a British "occupation [of the mouths of the rivers] for the purpose of preventing the Slave trade will afford a prepon-38 Ibid. If Harper was identifying John Pearce, the latter certainly was not "of a mild and humane character," Pearce was known as ruthless in obtaining his objectives in the river andwas a notorious slavetrader in his own right. derating influence over every other European or American Power. and will prevent them from effecting a National occupation through the intrigues of Liberia."42 To affect such a neutralization, if not outright cession in the Rio Pongo to Britain, Campbell obtained a written agreement through Proctor with several important chiefs and traders to the effect that the Pongo would remain open to trade with all nationals or strangers and that they, the signatories, wished "to be on terms of the most sincere ftiendship and free intercourse with him [Campbell] and with the Colony of Sierra Leone and Mr. M. Proctor of the Isles de Loss is requested to convey these sentiments to His Excellency.t'<' Jehudi Ashmun's forty-eight-hour visit to Freetown in 1827, his brief discussions with officials at the colony, and his subsequent excursion to the Rio Pongo and Rio Nunez, therefore, did little to relieve Campbell of these apprehensions.sApparently ignorant of Campbell's actions with respect to the Pongo, Ashmun interpreted discussions and events at Freetown differently. Ashmun reported that he and Campbell had discussed directly the fact that goods of British manufacture were allowed to pass tax-free into the Society's settlement at Cape Mesurado and that he and Campbell came, he believed, to some accommodation. In Ashmun's account, Campbell expressed a desire that "this liberality would be reciprocated by the Government of Sierra Leone," although Campbell noted that American goods entering British possessions were required by law to be carried on Britishregistered vessels: 4 ' Ashmun recollected that several letters passed between himself and Campbell, that he had exerted significant effort to explain that Liberia was not a colony of the United States, and, therefore, that agreements with Liberia should not be treated as an extension of agreements between the United States and Britain. 46 In his report to the Colonial Office, Campbell enclosed a copy of a letter from Ashmun to a Captain John Smith, a British subject, in which Ashmun had warned Smith against purchasing an island at the mouth of Junk River because that was within an American sphere.e? Clearly, Campbell was interested in such After his Freetown visit, Ashmun proceeded to the Pongo and later described the riverand its commerce in a report to the Society. He characterized the natural harbor in the upper reaches of the river as a major asset, though any vessel entering the river would risk tearing its bottom on reefs offshore. He observed that the local population and outsiders had already developed ZOnes of settlement and well-defined tenancy arrangements and that chiefs had joined, supposedly, in the 1820 request for settlers. Supplies offood goods were plentiful there, beller than at Cape Mesurado. Ashmun also suggested that the Pongo was centrally placed for the Colonization Society's future designs in West Africa, and noted that land had already been cleared for agriculture, a task that still needed to be accomplished at Cape Mesurado. On the negative side, Ashmun listed three issues. (I) Was it beller to divide the Society's efforts and possibly endanger its total success? (2) Would expansion into the Pongo risk the opposition of "foreign Governments," that is the British? (3) Could a settlement of African-Americans thrive amid a system of plantation slavery?,,8
Once Ashmun left the Pongo in 1827, however, a forceful British intervention in events unfolding along the river coincided with a concurrent shift in trader! headmen alliances, with Faber, Curtis, and Ormond joining forces against Lightbum and his allies. Clearly, a swing toward a more visible and openly British affiliation and away from an American promise of an exclusive and closed relationship with a single group of American commodity buyers occurred in 1827-1828. Much of the change resulted from continued conflict and subsequent palaver agreements. Lightbum and Wilkinson retained their positions as important traders, but they too had adjusted to expanding British markets and the increased vigilance of the Anti-Slave Trade Squadron. Plantation agriculture and companion slave trading in the Pongo continued into the 1840s, but the latter became riskier each year and the former became more profitable as trees planted in the mid1820s became mature enough to bear a good coffee crop and peanut culture expanded along the coast.t?
Despite these setbacks and the uncertainty of trading partners in the rivers, Baltimoreans continued to demonstrate a strong interest in the Rio Pongo and along this section of coast, but a new focus came with the expression of new voices. The principal proponents in Baltimore or of Baltimore experience had changed; Elisha Tyson died in 1824, General Robert Goodloe Harper in 1825, and Jehudi Ashmun in 1828. 50 In effect those proponents of the earlier schemes on the American side were removed by death. western Africa and an even grander scheme involving the rivers. 51 If the Rio Pongo or the Rio Nunez represented insecure investment areas and unlikely locations for the settlement of significant numbers of free or freed Aftican-Americans, perhaps planners could subsume both rivers within another, larger (and Societybased) plan for settlement and American influence along the coast.
Harper and Latrobe were encouraged in their thinking by better information about Aftica and by the emergence of new commodities available for trade from the continent. Both men remained loyal to General Harper's view that the gradual and systematic reduction of slavery in the United States through philanthropy or purchase and the removal of free and freed Aftican-Americans from the American republic were the ultimate solutions to America's slavery problem. In the meantime, however, opposition to total and involuntary emigration had increased significantly within the Society and within the free African-American community. In addition, different objectives within the American Colonization Society between those in the northern states who supported colonization as a way to expand civilization, commerce, and Christianity in Africa and supporters in the southern states who saw colonization as a way to rid the country of unwanted African-Americans were becoming more pronounced. Of particular concern to Harper and Latrobe, and to those supporting emigration, were published reports that African-Americans within the United States were increasing at a rate of 52,000 persons per annum. This figure suggested that it would be impossible, at the then rate of emigration to Liberia, for there ever to be complete removal from the republic. The answer was a simple one: the Society needed more settlement locations on the African coast, enough to receive annually no less than the annual natural increase in the United States. 52 Late in 1827, Latrobe had proposed that the American Colonization Society investigate the possibility of adding Cape Palmas on the Grain Coast and the island of Bulama, at the mouth of the Rio Grande, as sites for settlement, creating anchors for an Americo-Aftican state extending from Gambia to Cape Palmas on the Windward Coast. Latrobe aggressively suggested that:
Between Bulama and Liberia, is the colony of Sierra Leone, which the utter impossibility of sustaining, unless at a great expense of life, will ultimately cause the British to abandon-and which, even if it is not abandoned, must become a part of the Americo-African nation, as the increasing settlements of Liberia and Bulama enclose and embrace it. Once firruly fixed on the waters of the Rio Grande, we may deem ourselves in possession of those [mouths] of the Senegal and the Gambia; having dependant on our trade the nations near the head of the Niger; and, if the supposition as to the course of the St. Paul's be correct, enjoying an easy From the Senegal to Cape Palmas will then be our own; and we have only to cast our eyes upon the map to see the admirable frontier, which will be thus formed for our possessions,-a frontier including the mouths of the rivers Gambia, Rio Grande, Nunes, and Pongos, Sierra Leone, Cape Mount, Liberia, and last and among the most important, the Kroo nation, the native seamen of Africa,-a frontier easy of access from this country [United States], and affording in its rivers, roadsteds, and harbors, facilities forthemostextensive commerce.... Where is the flag of England? It waves still at Sierra Leone; but that Colony is one great lazarhouse [leprosarium] for the Europeans who visit it.... The simple facts of the independent existence of a civilized [Americo-African] nation of coloured people, on the coast of Africa, enjoying the fulness of virtuous liberty, governed by their own laws, administered by their own kind; and the abject state, in which the same race continues in this country, will cause the present stream of emigration to swell into a mighty and resistless torrent, sweeping on across the Atlantic; and the facilities of transportation afforded by the immense commerce, which must one day exist between the [Americo-African nation and United States] countries, will almost unaided bring about the great end of our labours. The Northern negro will find a home at Bulama; he from the Middle States will settle on the St. Pauls' [Mesurado] ; and the Southern slave, enfranchised by the liberal philanthropy of his master, will regain his father's home in the neighbourhood of Cape Palmas.-Then, Sir, shall we have accomplished our scheme, and with the blessing of the Almighty, have rendered unto Africa that which is Africa's.S' Latrobe appealed to northerners with the suggestion that slave trading along this coast had already been dealt a fatal blow by the successes of the Royal AntiSlavery Squadron and that the coast was now open to commerce, civilization, and evangelism as never before. To southerners, his plan promised an expanded home for repatriated African-Americans that would eventually remove all free AfricanAmericans from the republic.
For a moment, it appeared that Latrobe's grand plan to join the objectives of emigration, colonization, commerce, and evangelism and to relieve pressures building within the Society might actually receive a test. The Society agreed to his request for a study, and circumstances were developing in the U.S. that might ease its implementation. 54 The State of Maryland, for instance, had passed a bill in 1827 that appropriated $1,000 per annum to transport free African-Americans to Liberia, the first of many that might follow its lead. 55 Perhaps even more important was the discovery of a slave in the state of Mississippi named Abd alRahman Ibrahima who claimed to be the "favored" son of Alimaami Ibrahima Sori, ruler (1751 Sori, ruler ( -1761 Sori, ruler ( , 1778 Sori, ruler ( -1810 of the Fula state in the Fuuta Jaloo at the time of Ibrahima's capture and sale into slavery in 1788. According to his own account, he had been captured in the upper Pongo, carried overland to the Gambia River, and sold and transported to the Americas onboard the ship Africa. By the end of August 1788, Ibrahima Was the property of Thomas Foster who was then developing a plantation complex near Natchez, Mississippi. Between 1788 and 1826, Ibrahima remaiued in Foster's possession, married, fathered nine children, and became Foster's overseer, always maiutaining his allegiance to Islam and his lineage origins?6
Ibrahima's fortune changed in the mid-1820s wheu Andrew Marschalk, editor of the Mississippi Herald, a Natchez-based newspaper, learned of his claims to royalty. Marschalk suggested that Ibrahima write a letter to his father, whom Marschalk erroneously identified as the king of Morocco; iu 1826 a reluctant Ibrahima agreed to this proposal. Marschalk delivered Ibrahima's letter to Senator Thomas Reed of Mississippi, who carried it to Washington, D.C., and to the State Department. By early 1827, the letter had reached the American consul in Tangier who noticed errors in the letter and referred it to Washington with the counsel that Abd al-Rahman II, emir of Morocco, had requested Ibrahirna to be sent to Morocco. The consul suggested that all efforts be made to return Ibrahima to Africa, wherever his ancestral home might be. In response to a personal request from President John Quincy Adams, Foster agreed to free Ibrahima, with the provisiou that the federal government pay his transportation to Africa and that it require him to accept repatriation under the auspices of the American Colouization Society. At the age of sixty-five, Ibrahima fiually had obtained his promise of return to Timbo.>?
Ibrahima's arrival on the eastern coast of the United States in 1828, in preparation for departure for West Africa, played directly iuto the scheme for an "Americo-African nation" advanced by Baltimoreans Harper and Latrobe. For decades, British officials at Freetowu had recognized that nearly all rivers draining iuto the Windward Coast origiuated in the Fuuta Jaloo highlands and that the bonding of Timbo and Fula objectives to those .of the British would bring significant changes to West Africa. Perhaps linkage would lead to an end of slavetrading, consolidation of coastal commerce in theirhands, and open interior trade paths as far as the Niger River itself. In 1794, James Watt had led an expedition from Freetown to Timbo and received a promise of land and protection for any European venturing into Fuuta Jaloo and settling at Timbo?s Several British missionary societies responded to this offer, but the Church Missionary Society was the most successful, with schools established among the Susu in Thomas Gallaudet, founder of a college for educating hearing-impaired persons, also championed Ibrahima, describing his return to Africa as a moment of opportunity for evangelism and for the spread of civilization and commerce in Africa. Gallaudet's vision of conversion was continental in scope, for he believed that Ibrahima's conversion to Christianity would bring the conversion of his powerful Fula relatives and ultimately that Christianity would spread to the rest of the Fula population.s> Gallaudet's dream was indeed even more grand than Tappan's. According to Gallaudet, Tappan hoped to train "some coloured youths to go to Africa, even to its very interior, to become Commercial Agents, & possibly (inter nos) to induce the Government of the United States, to appoint a Consul to reside, if practicable, at Timbo."64 Understandably, Ibrahima's return to Africa won the approbation of both Charles Harper and John Latrobe, for it advanced their plan to create a grand "Americo-African nation" and expanded that vision significantly to include the headwaters of the rivers that their proposed state would subsume.s Ibrahima's departure on board the ship Harriet in February 1829, with wife but not his children, seemed to promise significant development for northern evangelical and commercial interests, and suggested the possibility of an expansion of new settlement locations as envisioned by Harper and Latrobe and southern emigrationists. Ibrahima had written ahead to officials in Monrovia, asking that a letter be forwarded to Timbo in which he requested that his relatives provide sufficient funds to purchase his family in America and monies that he would use to establish himself on the coast. Upon his arrival in Liberia, however, Ibrahima learned that the letter apparently had miscarried and that no response was awaiting him. Therefore, he wrote again and waited on the coast without resources. The rainy season began in mid-May, and Ibrahima died on 6 July 1829, with a Fula caravan then responding to his request within a hundred miles of the
coast,66
Ibrahima's untimely death brought a final end to any real possibility that there would be a grand American settlement on Africa's west coast, a plan that rested too heavily upon the successful return of one man to his country of origin. Apart from a 1831 request by Latrobe for a review of his Bulama proposal, the northern anchor for African-American settlement received no further attention within the national Colonization Society. From their perspective, the coast essentially was a frontier of European!American and African commerce. If the actual exchange remained on the African coast, the frontier would remain in Africa. But the arrangement proposed first by Pongobased traders and then expanded by Baltimoreans and Liberians represented a shift of emphasis in this frontier. By proposing an exclusive relationship, all parties were moving away from the principle of free trade and toward the establishment of extended linkages with distant markets and sources of trade goods on both sides of the Atlantic. Africans Or Pongo-based traders would have been linked directly to given markets, whether in Baltimore or at Monrovia. An expanded frontier of African-American trade for Liberia would have moved northward into the Rio Pongo. The grand plan of 1828-1830 would have tied the Pongo region! BaltimorelMonrovia group to the interior paths through an agreement with Timbo. This would have given the Americans access to Niger paths and commerce perhaps as far as Timbuktu. Perhaps such a plan was simply too optimistic a vision for the time. Or perhaps its proponents had tied the plan's foundations too closely to the enthusiasm and success of a few individuals. The exclusive arrangements of this sort that were new to the coast would soon become the rule rather than the exception.
